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Abstract
We propose a model to investigate the dynamics of fashion traits purely driven by social interactions. We
assume that people adapt their style to maximize social success and we describe the interaction as a repeated
group game in which the payoffs reflect the social norms dictated by fashion. On one hand, the tendency
to imitate the trendy stereotypes opposed to the tendency to diverge from them to proclaim identity; on
the other hand, the exploitation of sex appeal for dating success opposed to the moral principles of the
society. These opposing forces promote diversity in fashion traits, as predicted by the modeling framework
of Adaptive Dynamics. Our results link the so-called horizontal dynamics—the primary driver of fashion
evolution, compared with the vertical dynamics accounting for inter-class and economic drivers—to style
variety.
Keywords: Adaptive Dynamics, diversity, game theory, evolutionary branching, fashion, replicator equation,
social interactions.
1 Introduction
The dynamics of fashion traits has attracted much attention in the last century [Blumer, 1969, Simmel,2
1904, Sproles, 1979, 1985, Veblen, 1894]. The several driving forces of fashion are best described by Sproles
[1985]: “Psychologists speak of fashion as the seeking of individuality; sociologists see class competition and4
social conformity to norms of dress; economists see a pursuit of the scarce; aestheticians view the artistic
components and ideals of beauty; historians offer evolutionary explanations for changes in design. Literally6
hundreds of viewpoints unfold, from a literature more immense than for any phenomenon of consumer be-
havior.” Changes in fashion traits have been documented since the XVIII century [Lowe and Lowe, 1990,8
Richardson and Kroeber, 1940, Robinson, 1976, Sproles, 1981, Weeden, 1977, Young, 1937] and many stud-
ies tried to formally interpret and model fashion dynamics, from both the empirical [Lowe, 1993, Lowe and10
Lowe, 1982, 1983] and conceptual points of view [Caulkins et al., 2007, Miller et al., 1993, Pesendorfer,
1995]. But “The current state of fashion theory includes a loosely organized array of descriptive principles12
and propositions but is not formalized in that it does not specify a detailed structure of concepts, variables,
and relations” [Sproles, 1981].14
We focus on the evolution of fashion traits that emerges from pure personal choice driven by social
interactions, the so-called horizontal dynamics in the trickle-across [Field, 1970, Robinson, 1976, Simmel,16
1904] and trickle-up theories—“It now appears that some fashions, as well as some analogous nonfashion
phenomena, climb the status pyramid from below, trickling up, as it were” [Field, 1970]. We intentionally18
do not consider all vertical drivers of fashion, related to social class differences among consumers and the
tendency to emulate stereotypes from higher classes (investigated in the trickle-down theory [Simmel, 1904,20
Veblen, 1894]) and to economic aspects from both the production (business, marketing, design, and manu-
facturing) and the consumer (budget) sides. This is in line with the view of Blumer [1969], who considers22
intra-class social interactions (the horizontal dynamics) dominant with respect to (vertical) inter-class and
economic drivers. “The fashion mechanism appears not in response to a need of class differentiation and24
class emulation but in response to a wish to be in fashion, to be abreast of what has good standing, to express
new tastes which are emerging in a changing world” [Blumer, 1969]. Change in fashion traits is for Blumer26
the result of “the gradual formation and refinement of collective tastes, which occur through social interaction
among people with similar interests and social experience, with the result that many people develop tastes in28
common.”
Although Blumer’s view is debatable—the dominance between horizontal and vertical dynamics certainly30
depends on the particular fashion sector considered—inter-class and economic drivers are important aspects
of fashion and, as such, they have been incorporated in conceptual models [Caulkins et al., 2007, Pesendorfer,32
1995], lacking however detail on the horizontal aspects. Here we do not consider the vertical drivers because
our aim is to model and study the horizontal dynamics of fashion in isolation. Thus, our model directly applies34
to situations in which individuals are free to adapt and innovate their own style of dress, appearance, and/or
behavior, and they do so in response to social interactions, rather than to strategic marketing campaigns.36
The closest analog in the literature to our investigation is Miller’s et al. [1993] innovative paper, in which
individuals adapt their style to maximize an utility based on a value linked to the style and on the reputation38
and style of the people in the individual’s social network.
Specifically, we want to assess whether the social interaction between common-class people can be re-40
sponsible of the emergence of variety in fashion traits. To this endeavour, we see Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Maynard Smith, 1982] and Adaptive Dynamics (AD) [Dercole and42
Rinaldi, 2008, Geritz et al., 1997, 1998, Metz et al., 1996]—two mathematical approaches borrowed from
evolutionary biology—as the promising frameworks to model the evolution of social traits, fashion traits in44
particular.
We use the flexibility of game theory to model a dating game (as in Pesendorfer [1995]). This is the step46
where most modeling assumptions are made. A one-dimensional continuous trait is used (as in Miller et al.
[1993] and Caulkins et al. [2007]) to abstractly describe the key stylistic attributes of consumer goods, and the48
strategy of an individual is identified by the adopted style. No business, marketing, and production aspects
are considered, as well as no individual class differentiation. The social dynamics resulting from repeated50
rounds of the dating games are modeled with the standard replicator equation [Schuster and Sigmund, 1983,
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Taylor and Jonker, 1978] of EGT, a set of differential equations giving the change in time of the shares of
a given set of coexisting styles. Social success is therefore measured by dating success [Barber, 1999] and2
the styles conferring the highest success will grow in share. EGT also provides the concepts and tools for
discussing the robustness of a set of mainstream styles against invasion by an innovative variants. Sequences4
of successful small innovations can then accumulate and produce the gradual evolution of fashion envisaged
by Blumer [1969]. AD exactly provides the modeling framework for this long-term evolution, including the6
endogenous proliferation of styles from common “classics”—evolutionary branching—and the endogenous
elimination of obsolete styles—evolutionary extinction. Although AD has been primarily developed for8
application in evolutionary biology, innovation and competition play in social sciences the analogous role of
genetic mutations and natural selection [Ziman, 2000].10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical methods, the rules
of social (dating) game (Sect. 2.1), the social replicator dynamics (Sect. 2.2), and the AD framework to12
describe fashion evolution (Sect. 2.3). Sect. 2.3 presents the model analysis, starting from a stylistic uniform
society, and discusses the conditions for the diversification of fashion. Further discussion and comparison14
with the fashion literature and models closes the paper in Sect. 4.
2 Methods16
We study a (technically infinite and well-mixed) society in which each individual has his/her own style, that
we represent with a one-dimensional continuous trait or strategy x assumed to be positively related with the18
sex appeal of the adopted style. This is supported by many authors [Laver, 1937, Lurie, 1981, Steele, 1985,
Veblen, 1894]. E.g., Steele [1985] argues: “Because clothing is so intimately connected to the physical self, it20
automatically carries an erotic charge,” while Lurie [1981] applies psychoanalytic theory in the description
of what is communicated by one’s hats and umbrellas, women’s handbags, men’s walking sticks and ties.22
For example, x could measure the sizes of clothes (as in Lowe and Lowe [1990], who report fluctuations
and variety in the skirt length of women’s evening dresses over two centuries). For simplicity, x is assumed24
unbounded and can be interpreted as a physical measure through a suitable scaling.
Individuals with same style are grouped into sub-populations, which we assume to occur in finite number.26
Let S be the number of different styles in the society, x1 < x2 < · · · < xS the traits representing the styles
from the most austere to the most sexy, and n1, n2, . . . , nS the corresponding fractions (or frequencies) of28
people adopting styles x1, x2, . . . , xS (n1+ n2 + · · ·+ nS = 1).
Individuals with different styles compete in their everyday life for their social success [Lowe and Lowe,30
1983], here mainly focused on dating success [Barber, 1999]. We imagine that people repeatedly meet at
social events involving a finite group of N randomly selected individuals and we indicate with N1, N2, . . . , NS32
(N1 + N2 + · · · + NS = N) the numbers of xi-strategists in the selected group i = 1, . . . , S. We evaluate
their dating success as the expected payoff of an underlying N -player game, indicating with Pi the expected34
payoff for style i.
2.1 The social game36
We assume the social payoff for strategy xi to be the sum of four contributions.
• The payoff for being trendy. It is the advantage to conform to one of the mainstream styles established38
in the society [Efferson et al., 2008b]. We quantify it with the fraction of people in the society adopting
a style similar to xi, and we scale it through the trendy payoff τ . In formulas, we write40
Pτ (xi) := τ
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(xi − xj)
2), (1a)
where the width of the Gaussian bell exp(−α(xi − xj)
2), regulated by the (positive) parameter α,
defines similarity. The similarity exponent α measures the style sensitivity of the society, i.e., how42
sensitive people are to differences in style. Although the sensitivity to style is rather personal and
3
could be relative to the austere-sexy character of the style, we consider a sort of average value across
the society. If α is sufficiently large, the Gaussian bell is narrow and the trendy payoff for strategy xi2
is essentially scaled by the fraction of people adopting xi. Independently of α, if everyone is adopting
the same style x1, then Pτ (x1) = τ .4
• The payoff for originality. It is the advantage to be distinct from the styles present at a social event, i.e.,
a gain/loss to be minority/majority [Esposito, 2011]. We quantify it by removing from 12 the fraction6
of people in the social event adopting a style similar to xi, and we scale it through the originality payoff
ε. In formulas, we write8
Pε(xi) := ε
(
1
2 −
S∑
j=1
Nj
N
exp(−α(xi − xj)
2)
)
, (1b)
where the Gaussian bell defining similarity is the same as in (1a). If α is sufficiently large, the originality
payoff for strategy xi is essentially scaled by
1
2 minus the fraction of people adopting xi. Independently10
of α, if style i is highly innovative (xi far from all xj , j 6= i) and adopted by one or a few individuals
at a big event (large N), then Pε(xi) maximizes at
1
2 ε. On the other hand, if everyone is adopting the12
same style the payoff drops to − 12 ε.
• The payoff for being sexy. It is a relative advantage for sexy vs. austere styles when competing for dating14
at a social event [Laver, 1937, Lurie, 1981, Steele, 1985, Veblen, 1894]. We quantify it by weighting
the differences in strategy w.r.t. the competitors present at the social event, by the probabilities of16
interacting with such competitors, and we scale it through the sexy payoff σ. In formulas, we write
Pσ(xi) := σ
S∑
j=1
(xi − xj)
Nj
N − 1
. (1c)
Note that the sexy payoff σ is defined per unit of style difference w.r.t. the competitor and that the18
probability of interaction with a same-style competitor is actually (Ni−1)/(N−1), but this is irrelevant
in (1c).20
• The payoff for respecting morality. It is an absolute judgment on style, given by the morality codes
uniformly accepted in the society [Lowe and Lowe, 1983]. It solely depends on the style adopted by an22
individual, and it is expressed as
Pµ(xi) := µ
(
1− exp(β(xi − x0))
)
, (1d)
where µ is the morality payoff obtained by an extremely austere style (xi → −∞) and x0 represents24
a morality threshold somehow separating austere from sexy (immoral) styles. The payoff is positive
for austere styles (xi < x0) and negative for sexy styles (xi > x0), with and exponential punishment26
towards highly immoral display. The morality exponent β is a sort of average moral sensitivity of the
society.28
The expected payoff Pi for a focal xi-strategist attending a social event is then obtained by weighting
the sum of the four above contributions over all possible compositions of the other N − 1 attendants.30
For example, for S = 1, there is a uniform style x1 in the society (n1 = 1) and each social event is
composed by x1-strategists. Their payoff is trivially given by32
P1 = τ −
1
2 ε+ µ(1 − exp(β(x1 − x0))), (2)
where the payoff for being trendy is maximal (τ) and that for originality minimal (− 12 ε), whereas there is
no advantage to be sexy all individuals being equal.34
For S = 2, two-style society, the probability that a focal x1-strategist attends a social event with N2
x2-strategists (and N1 − 1 other x1-strategists) is given by the binomial distribution
(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2 .36
4
Similarly, a focal x2-strategist attends a social event with N1 x1-strategists (and N2− 1 other x2-strategists)
with probability
(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2 . The expected payoff P1 and P2 are therefore given by2
P1 =
N−1∑
N2=0
(
Pτ (x1) + Pε(x1) + Pσ(x1) + Pµ(x1)
)(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2 , (3a)
P2 =
N−1∑
N1=0
(
Pτ (x2) + Pε(x2) + Pσ(x2) + Pµ(x2)
)(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2 . (3b)
Then, substituting the expressions (1a–d) into (3) and computing the resulting sums (see Appendix), we
obtain the following expressions:4
P1 = τ
(
n1 + n2 exp(−α(x1 − x2)
2)
)
+ ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
n1 −
N−1
N
n2 exp(−α(x1 − x2)
2)
)
+ σn2(x1 − x2) + µ
(
1− exp(β(x1 − x0))
)
, (4a)
P2 = τ
(
n1 exp(−α(x2 − x1)
2) + n2
)
+ ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
n1 exp(−α(x2 − x1)
2)− N−1
N
n2
)
+ σn1(x2 − x1) + µ
(
1− exp(β(x2 − x0))
)
. (4b)
Note the originality terms in (4a), where the three contributions removed from 12 are related to the focal
individual (1/N), to the other same-style individuals, and to the other competing style.6
The computation of the expected payoff Pi, i = 1, . . . , S, for the general case of a S-style society (S > 2) is
more involved and reported in Appendix. It essentially makes use of the multinomial probability distribution8
for the composition of the N − 1 attendants of the social event met by the focal xi-strategist. The result is
Pi = τ
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(xi−xj)
2)+ε
(
1
2−
1
N
−N−1
N
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(xi−xj)
2)
)
+σ
S∑
j=1
nj(xi−xj)+µ
(
1−exp(β(xi−x0)),
(5)
which naturally generalizes P1 and P2 in eqs. (4a,b).10
2.2 The social dynamics
We model the competition between the different styles present in the society with the standard replicator12
equation [Schuster and Sigmund, 1983, Taylor and Jonker, 1978]. It deterministically describes the change
in time of the styles’ frequencies resulting from repeated rounds of the game defined in Sect. 2.1, assuming14
that the rounds take place on a faster time scale. Being randomly selected for repeated social events,
each individual with style xi realizes, on average, a dating success quantified by the expected payoff Pi,16
and decides whether to change from style xi to xj with a probability proportional to the payoff difference
Pj −Pi, j = 1, . . . , S. Separating the game time scale—the time scale of everyday life—from the social time18
scale on which shifts from one style to another can be observed—typically from one season to the next—the
replicator equation,20
d
dtni(t) = ni(t)(Pi − P¯ ), P¯ :=
S∑
j=1
nj(t)Pj , i = 1, . . . , S, (6)
says that style i gains share at time t (i.e., n˙i(t) > 0) if the expected payoff Pi of the xi-strategist is higher
than the average payoff P¯ in the society, where t here spans the social time scale.22
Note that
S∑
j=1
d
dt nj(t) =
S∑
j=1
nj(t)Pj − P¯
S∑
j=1
nj(t) = 0 (7)
by definition of P¯ , so that the sum of the frequencies remains constant at 1.24
The styles’ frequencies converge, in the long run, to one of the attractors of the replicator eq. (6). Although
the nonlinearity of the equation allows for nonstationary (periodic or chaotic) attractors, we focus on stable26
equilibria, at which dni/dt = 0 for all i. Only positive equilibria (i.e., n¯i > 0 for all i) are of interest, since
5
negative frequencies make no sense and a reduced-order replicator eq. should be used if some of the styles
are absent at the equilibrium. All styles gain the same average payoff P¯ at a positive equilibrium.2
Taking the constraint (7) into account, and denoting the equilibrium frequencies with an overbar, equi-
libria can be computed by solving4 (
Pi − Pi+1
)∣∣∣nj=n¯j,j=1,...,S
n¯S=1−
∑S−1
j=1
n¯j
= 0, i = 1, . . . , S − 1, (8)
for the unknowns n¯1, . . . , n¯S−1 and then setting n¯S = 1−
∑S−1
j=1 n¯j . The stability of equilibria can be checked
by looking at the eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics in their vicinity (negative real parts of all but one6
eigenvalues implying stability—one eigenvalue is always null by the constraint (7)).
Finally, recall that the equilibrium frequencies are functions of the corresponding styles, that play in (6)8
the role of model parameters. Packing styles and frequencies in S-dimensional vectors, we compactly write
n := (n1, . . . , nS) = n¯(x) := (n¯1(x), . . . , n¯S(x)), x := (x1, . . . , xS). (9)
2.3 The fashion dynamics10
Suppose S different mainstream styles steadily coexist in the society at a stable and positive social equilibrium
(9) of the replicator eq. (6). If an innovative style x′ is introduced by one or a few individuals in the society,12
i.e., with infinitesimal frequency n′, the success or flop of the new style can be discussed by extending
model (6), locally to the equilibrium (9), with the equation14
d
dt n
′(t) = n′(t)(P ′ − P¯ ), (10)
where P ′ is the expected payoff of the new style x′ just after its introduction. Note that n = n¯(x) and n′= 0
is an equilibrium of the (locally) extended replicator equation (6, 10) and its instability/stability corresponds16
to the initial success/flop of x′.
The expected payoff P ′ can be computed using formula (5) as follows. Renaming x′ and n′ with xS+118
and nS+1, we can in fact use (5) with S + 1 styles and i = S + 1 and note that the infinitesimal frequency
nS+1 annihilates all last terms in the sums. That is20
P ′= τ
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(x
′−xj)
2)+ε
(
1
2−
1
N
−N−1
N
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(x
′−xj)
2)
)
+σ
S∑
j=1
nj(x
′−xj)+µ
(
1−exp(β(x′−x0)).
(11)
For S = 1 (innovation in a uniform society) we have
P ′= τ exp(−α(x′− x1)
2) + ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
exp(−α(x′− x1)
2)
)
+ σ(x′− x1) + µ(1− exp(β(x
′− x0))), (12)
whereas for S = 2 (innovation in a two-style society) we have22
P ′ = τ
(
n1 exp(−α(x
′ − x1)
2) + n2 exp(−α(x
′ − x2)
2)
)
+ ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
n1 exp(−α(x
′ − x1)
2)− N−1
N
n2 exp(−α(x
′ − x2)
2)
)
(13)
+ σ
(
(x′ − x1)n1 + (x
′ − x2)n2
)
+ µ
(
1− exp(β(x′ − x0))
)
.
Once P ′ is computed, we can use eq. (10) to evaluate the initial (relative) growth rate dn′/dt/n′ of the
innovation, locally to the social equilibrium (9). In biological terms, it gives the invasion fitness of the24
innovative style, that we indicate with
λ(x, x′) =
(
P ′ − P¯
)∣∣
n=n¯(x)
. (14)
Note that λ(x, x′) depends only on the mainstream styles in vector x and on the innovative style x′. Tech-26
nically, it is the eigenvalue associated to the equilibrium (9) (extended with n′ = 0) along the direction of
invasion. Positive/negative fitness implies the success/flop of the style, according to model (6, 10, 11).28
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Adaptive Dynamics [AD; Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008, Geritz et al., 1997, 1998, Metz et al., 1996] —
originally developed for modeling the evolution of phenotypic traits in biology—is here used to describes the2
evolution of fashion, resulting from small stylistic innovations that replace the former mainstream styles.
Assuming that innovations are small ensures a gradual (mathematically continuous) evolution of the main-4
stream traits, and this is envisaged in biology as well as in the context of fashion. For example, Blumer
[1969] supports the historical continuity of fashion change, where new styles evolve from those previously6
established in the society. And Lowe and Lowe [1983] assume that fashion change is ruled by inertia (e.g., if
skirts have been progressively rising for the last few years, they will continue to rise up to an extreme) and8
resistance to that motion (large year-to-year jumps in one direction create force back the other way).
AD further assumes that innovations are sufficiently rare on the social time scale. Although this is not10
strictly necessary [Mesze´na et al., 2005], it keeps the AD-picture simple. It guaranties that the frequencies of
the mainstream styles are close to the equilibrium (9) whenever an innovation occurs, and that the (globally)12
extended replicator dynamics (i.e., eq. (6) with S increased by one, xS+1 := x
′, and nS+1 := n
′) has time to
converge to a new social equilibrium before the next innovation.14
With respect to the locally extended replicator equation (6, 10, 11), the globally extended one describes
the mainstream-innovative competition far from the equilibrium (9). It is the so-called resident-invader16
model of AD. Interestingly, it does not need to be analyzed, as invasion of an xi-innovation under a nonva-
nishing selection gradient18
si(x) :=
∂
∂x′
λ(x, x′)
∣∣
x′=xi
(15)
has been shown to imply the substitution of the former mainstream style xi by x
′ [Dercole and Rinaldi,
2008, Geritz, 2005, Mesze´na et al., 2005]. That is, if the fitness (14) of the innovation—at first-order20
given by si(x) (x
′ − xi)—is positive, then the resident-invader trajectory starting sufficiently close to equi-
librium (9) and with arbitrarily small nS+1 converges to the new equilibrium at which ni = 0, nS+1 =22
n¯i(x1, . . . , xi−1, x
′, xi+1, . . . , xS), and nj = n¯j(x1, . . . , xi−1, x
′, xi+1, . . . , xS), j 6= i. Then, renaming x
′ with
xi and nS+1 with ni, the society is back characterized by S mainstream styles x1, . . . , xS , with style i slightly24
changed.
Thus, as long as the selection gradients do not all vanish, fashion evolution proceeds by sequences of26
small successful innovations in the directions dictated by (15), i = 1, . . . , S. Unsuccessful innovations (i.e.,
those for which si(x) (x
′ − xi) < 0) are obviously lost. In the limit of infinitesimal innovations, evolution28
become smooth and described by the so-called AD canonical equation [Champagnat et al., 2006, Dieckmann
and Law, 1996]30
x˙i =
1
2 ρ n¯i(x)si(x), (16)
where the dot-notation represents the time derivative on a slower fashion time scale (decades, centuries),
the factor 12 takes into account that half of the innovations are on average unsuccessful, and the constant32
ρ is proportional to the frequency and average breadth (the variance) of innovations. The AD canonical
equation give the expected evolutionary path, averaging among all the possible innovations (see Dercole and34
Rinaldi [2008], Chap. 3, for a simplified comprehensive derivation).
The most interesting aspect of AD is to account for the evolution of diversity in the system. The number36
of coexisting styles increases through evolutionary branching—the diversification of two initially similar
styles after the coexistence of an innovation with its mainstream generator—and is pruned by evolutionary38
extinction—the evolution of x toward a boundary in trait space at which some of the components of the
social equilibrium n¯(x) vanish, or the equilibrium itself stops to exist.40
Mainstream-innovative coexistence can only occur in the vicinity of a fashion equilibrium x¯ at which all
selection gradients (15), i = 1, . . . , S, vanish. It is possible, for an xi-innovation under the condition42
Ci :=
∂2
∂x∂x′
λ(x, x′)
∣∣∣
x′=xi,x=x¯
< 0 (17)
[Dercole and Geritz, 2016, Geritz, 2005, Mesze´na et al., 2005], whereas the diversification of the two initially
similar coexisting styles—and hence their establishment as distinct mainstream styles—occurs under the44
condition
Bi :=
∂2
∂x′
2 λ(x, x
′)
∣∣∣
x′=xi,x=x¯
> 0 (18)
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[Geritz et al., 1997, 1998]. Specifically, under Bi 6= 0, the two similar coexixting styles are under opposite
selection gradients. If Bi > 0, the fitness landscape is an upward parabola w.r.t. x
′ locally to x = x¯—a fitness2
minimum—so that close to x¯ both more and less sexy innovations are favored in style i. After coexistence,
assuming (without loss of generality) x′ > xi, Bi > 0 implies that more sexy innovations are favored in styles4
x′, whereas the opposite occurs in style xi. In the AD jargon, selection is said to be disruptive. Otherwise,
Bi < 0, the fitness landscape is a downward x
′-parabola locally to x = x¯—a fitness maximum—so close to6
x¯ most innovations are rejected. If Ci < 0, coexistence is possible, however, innovative styles in between xi
and x′ perform better, so that style i does not branch. Selection is in this case stabilizing, i.e., acting against8
diversification.
If branching is possible for several i, generically it develops only in the style with largest Bi (largest rate10
of initial divergence), the other incipient branchings being “missed” [Kisdi, 1999, Landi et al., 2013]. The
fastest trait divergence in fact alters the society faced by the other pairs of similar coexisting styles, and12
typically breaks the conditions for their coexistence. If branching is not possible for any i, then the fashion
equilibrium x¯ is a terminal point of fashion evolution.14
Note that the coexistence and branching conditions (17) and (18) are only sufficient. In case Ci and/or
Bi do vanish, the higher-order terms in the fitness expansion play a role. These degenerate situations can16
be studied in the spirit of bifurcation analysis [Della Rossa et al., 2015, Dercole and Geritz, 2016], but this
is not discussed. Further note that condition (17) involves, by the chain rule, the x-derivative of the social18
equilibrium n¯(x).
After evolutionary branching, the dynamics of fashion is described by an extended canonical equation,20
that can lead the new mainstream styles to a new fashion equilibrium and further branch. Similarly, after
evolutionary extinction, the dynamics of fashion is described by a new canonical equation, this time with a22
reduced number of survived coevolving styles.
3 Results24
Let’s start the analysis of the model from a stylistic uniform society, with style x1 and social equilibrium
n¯1(x1) = 1. The invasion fitness of an innovative style x
′ is obtained from (14), where P ′ and P¯ = P1 are26
given by (12) and (2), respectively, i.e.,
λ(x1, x
′) =
(
P ′ − P1
)∣∣
n1=1
= τ
(
exp(−α(x′ − x1)
2)− 1
)
+ ε
(
1− 1
N
− N−1
N
exp(−α(x′ − x1)
2)
)
+ σ(x′ − x1) + µ
(
exp(β(x1 − x0))− exp(β(x
′ − x0))
)
. (19)
The style x1 evolves according to eq. (16), that (setting ρ = 2) takes the following specific form:28
x˙1 = s1(x1) := σ − µβ exp(β(x1 − x0)). (20)
The two driving forces regulating fashion dynamics in eq. (20) are sex appeal (σ) and morality (µβ), respec-
tively pushing for sexy and austere styles. They balance at the fashion equilibrium30
x¯1 = x0 +
1
β
ln
(
σ
µβ
)
, (21)
defined by s1(x¯1) = 0. Note that the trendy payoff τ and the originality payoff ε play no role in eq. (20).
The reason is that the advantage to be trendy (τ) and that of being original (ε) are marginal when x′ moves32
toward x1 (their contributions to the fitness (19) vanish quadratically), whereas the advantage/disadvantage
conferred by sex appeal and morality are dominant (their contributions to the fitness are linear with the34
difference x′−x1). As we now see, the opposed pressures to be trendy and original drive fashion diversification.
The coexistence and branching conditions (17) and (18) for the mono-style equilibrium (21) become36
C1 = −2α
(
N−1
N
ε− τ
)
and B1 = 2α
(
N−1
N
ε− τ
)
− σβ. (22)
If the originality payoff ε is large compared to the trendy payoff τ , both the coexistence (C1 < 0) and
branching (B1 > 0) conditions are satisfied. Then, two similar styles (x1, x2) close to (x¯1, x¯1) can coexist38
8
and further innovations in the two styles lead to their diversification. Note that if N is sufficiently large—big
social games, e.g. those virtually played on social networks—the coexistence condition reduces to ε > τ ,2
whereas branching requires 2α(ε − τ) to overcome the stabilizing force σβ. If the advantage of being more
sexy (σ) and that of being more austere (more properly measured by the morality exponent β rather than4
by the payoff µ for the extremely austere style) are too large, the fashion dynamics is strongly stabilized
at x¯1 (−σβ is indeed the eigenvalue of the equilibrium (21), i.e., dx˙1/dx1|x1=x¯1) and this stabilizing force6
acts against branching. That is, the dynamic stability of the mono-style equilibrium (21)—its attractiveness
for the mono-style canonical equation (20)—contributes to its evolutionary stability—the property of being8
uninvadable by small innovations [Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008, Geritz et al., 1997, 1998, Metz et al., 1996].
It is thus the need to proclaim identity and individual affirmation (ε) that fosters fashion variety. More-10
over, after mainstream-innovative coexistence, fashion diversification is favored/disfavored in societies where
people are more/less sensitive to style (large/small α). Although these results might seem unsurprising—ε12
and τ measuring the advantage and disadvantage of rarity—note that while a premium to rarity obviously
favors the coexistence of different styles, their divergence by sequences of further innovations is less trivial.14
Indeed, after mainstream-innovative coexistence, innovative styles that are more sexy or more austere of both
of the two coexisting ones do exploit originality better than innovations in between. All this is confirmed by16
the following analysis of the model for S ≥ 2.
After branching, the society is characterized by two mainstream styles, x1 and x2, x = (x1, x2), coexisting18
at the social equilibrium
n¯1(x) =
1
2
(
1 +
σ(x2 − x1) + µ
(
exp(β(x1 − x0))− exp(β(x2 − x0))
)
τ
(
1− exp(−α(x1 − x2)2)
)
− εN−1
N
(
1− exp(−α(x1 − x2)2)
)
)
, n¯2(x) = 1− n¯1(x) (23)
(obtained by solving eq. (8), i = 1). The fitness of an innovative style x′ similar to x1 or x2 can be computed20
from (14), where P ′ is given in (13) and P¯ = n1P1 + n2P2 with P1 and P2 in (4a,b).
The two coexisting styles coevolve according to a two-dimensional AD canonical equation (see eqs. (15)22
and (16), i = 1, 2), that is here not shown because long and not particularly easy to be interpreted. Its
simulation, starting from x2 > x1 close to the mono-style fashion equilibrium x¯1 is however pictured in24
Fig. 1 (two-style society). The two initially similar styles further and further differentiate. They coexist by
exploiting different niches of the social game, the (slight minority of) austere x1-strategists (see the gray26
scale indicating the x1- and x2-frequencies) losing sex appeal but gaining in moral reputation and originality,
compared with the (slight majority of) the sexy x2-strategists. Eventually, the two-style fashion dynamics28
converge to an equilibrium at which both the austere and the sexy styles can branch (see the coexistence and
branching conditions in the caption of Fig. 1). As generically expected, branching actually develops only in30
style 1 (with faster rate of initial divergence, B1 > B2).
After the second branching, the society is characterized by three mainstream styles, x1, x2, and x3,32
x = (x1, x2, x3). The frequencies n¯1(x), n¯2(x), n¯3(x) = 1 − n¯1(x) − n¯2(x) of the corresponding social
equilibrium can be computed analytically, solving eq. (8) for i = 1, 2, but the resulting expressions are long34
and not shown. The fitness of an innovative style x′ similar to x1, x2, or x3 can be computed from (14),
where P ′ and P¯ = n1P1 + n2P2 + n3P3 can be obtained form eqs. (11) and (5) for S = 3.36
The three coexisting styles coevolve according to a three-dimensional AD canonical equation (see eqs. (15)
and (16), i = 1, 2, 3) (not shown). Its simulation, starting from x2 > x1 close to the equilibrium style x¯138
of the two-style society and x3 = x¯2 is pictured in Fig. 1 (three-style society). The two initially similar
styles differentiate, again with a (slight) minority of more austere strategists (x1) exploiting morality and40
originality, with respect to a (slight) majority of more sexy strategists (though still austere, x2 < x0 = 0).
Eventually, the three-style fashion dynamics converge to a fashion equilibrium at which branching is possible42
in all styles. Again branching occurs in style 1 (largest Bi, see caption), but this is not shown in the figure.
Note that upon convergence to the fashion equilibrium, the time at which branching is triggered is rather44
arbitrary (see the color transitions in Fig. 1). In reality, it is related to the time of occurrence of the
innovation leading to branching.46
Also note that styles close to x0 return in vogue during the three-style society, after a long period
characterized by two opposed mainstream styles far from x0. Thus, recurrent diversification could also48
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Figure 1: Simulated fashion evolution. Uniform style society (reddish): initial strategy x1(0) = −0.5, equi-
librium x¯1 = 0 (see (21)), coexistence and branching conditions C1 = −160, B1 = 159. Two-style society
(greenish): initial strategy (x1(10), x2(10)) = (x¯1 − 10
−3, x¯1 + 10
−3), equilibrium (x¯1, x¯2) = (−0.42, 0.29),
coexistence and branching conditions C1 = −79.68, B1 = 74.60, C2 = −80.29, B2 = 74.55. Three-
style society (bluish): initial strategy (x1(10), x2(10), x3(10)) = (x¯1 − 10
−3, x¯1 + 10
−3, x¯2), equilibrium
(x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) = (−0.78,−0.13, 0.50), coexistence and branching conditions C1 = −51.53, B1 = 44.98,
C2 = −51.61, B2 = 41.70, C3 = −53.09, B3 = 44.36. Gray scale: styles’ frequencies. Parameters:
τ = σ = µ = β = 1, ε = α = N = 10, x0 = 0.
explain the revival of old-fashion styles.
Following the numerical procedure developed in [Landi et al., 2013], the conditions Ci = 0 and Bi = 02
can be continued in two-dimensional parameter spaces, producing the contour lines separating the regions in
which the coexistence and branching discriminants, Ci and Bi, are respectively positive and negative. This4
can be done for the mono-style, as well as for the two-, three-, and S-style fashion equilibria, S ≥ 4, and the
result for different pairs of model parameters is shown in Fig. 2.6
The top panels of the figure show the effect of the model parameters controlling the two social mechanisms
responsible for branching, i.e., conformity and identity, as measured by the payoffs for being trendy and8
original. Panel a illustrates our main result. If the originality payoff ε is sufficiently larger than the trendy
payoff τ , then style variety is fostered by the social interaction. The straight regions’ boundaries, with almost10
45-degree inclination, suggest that the difference between the two payoffs basically matters for branching.
However, a careful inspection of the innovation fitness (14), and of the expression (11) of P ′ in particular,12
shows that
(
N−1
N
ε − τ
)
is the quantity that actually matters, thanks to the use of the same similarity
exponent α in eqs. (1a,b). For the first branching this is evident from the coexistence (C1 < 0) and14
branching (B1 > 0) conditions in (22), but the property remains true also for the further branchings and
N−1
N
is actually the inclination coefficient of the regions’ boundaries in panel a. This property is due to the16
fact that the conformity and identity mechanisms work at different scale in our model. The former at the
scale of the whole society—because we assume the established mainstream styles to be globally known (by18
word of mouth or social and communication media)—the latter at the local scale of the social events. As a
result, the effect of the originality payoff ε is scaled by (N−1)/N . As the scaling quickly saturates to one with20
N , the difference ε− τ is, in practice, the key parameter for branching when the game group size N is, say,
at least 10 (N = 10 in panel a). This is confirmed in panel b, which shows how in small-group interactions22
branching requires a stronger unbalance between the conformity and identity premiums. Similarly, panel c
shows that a stronger unbalance is required if people are less sensitive to differences in style (small α).24
The bottom panels of Fig. 2 show the effect of the model parameters controlling the other two social
mechanisms, sex appeal and morality, that are responsible of the stability (dynamic and evolutionary) of26
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Figure 2: Regions in two-dimensional parameter spaces allowing the diversification of fashion. Starting from
a stylistic uniform society, no branching is possible in region 1, whereas branching takes place and allows
the coexistence of 2, 3, ≥ 4 different mainstream styles. Other parameters as in Figure 1.
the mono-style equilibrium. Panel d shows the effect of the two main parameters, the sexy payoff σ and
the people’s sensitivity β to morality. As suggested by the branching condition (B1 > 0) in (22), the panel2
(with somehow hyperbolic regions’ boundaries) confirms that the product σβ is the relevant quantity for
branching. Branching indeed develops under disruptive selection, that initially makes the two branching4
styles diverge, one becoming more sexy, the other more austere (see Fig. 1). Too large values of σ and β
respectively oppose the development of the austere and sexy branches, and therefore prevent selection from6
being disruptive. Panel e shows how the group size N affects the stabilizing force of σ (a similar result holds
for β). Finally, panel f considers the mixed effects of the original-trendy unbalance ε− τ and the stabilizing8
force σβ (the effect of ε and σ at constant τ and β is actually shown). Consistently with the branching
condition (B1 > 0) in (22), the panel shows a proportionality between the effects of the two mechanisms in10
fostering and preventing branching, respectively. The disruptive force produced the seek of identity can then
be counterbalanced by the relative advantages of sexy and austere styles. This is a non-trivial conclusion12
supported by our model.
The ranges of the parameter values used in Fig. 2 show all relevant regions (1, 2, 3, ≥ 4), see, e.g., the14
small region 1 (no branching) obtained in panel e for large sexy payoff σ in small-group games, indicating that
the stabilizing force of σ must be very strong to prevent branching in a society with a significant premium for16
originality (ε− τ = 9 from Fig. 1). As for the physical meaning of the numerical values, recall that payoffs
measure the individual’s dating success at repeated social events, so that they can be arbitrarily rescaled. In18
particular, recall that the sexy payoff σ is the payoff obtained per unit of style difference w.r.t. a competitor
(see eq. (1c)). E.g., if x is the skirt length of women’s evening dresses (as in Lowe and Lowe [1990]), σ = 9020
compared with σ = 1 (see panel e) means that the obtained dating success is 90-times more sensitive to the
skirt length. Another way to physically interpret the parameter values comes from the fitness definition in22
eq. (14). The fitness gives the initial rate of share increase of a successful innovation along the social time
11
scale, and is obtained as the expected payoff surplus obtained by the innovative style compared with the
average in the society. This shows how payoffs are numerically relative to the chosen time scale and offers2
an empirical way to identify payoff values from data in a specific context.
All panels in Fig. 2 suggest that a full cascade of branching is possible. We have checked this up to S = 3,4
i.e., going from region 3 to region ≥ 4 along with parameter changes, the three-style fashion equilibrium
changes nature, from a terminal point of fashion dynamics to a branching point. Note that some of the6
regions’ boundaries separate regions with non-consecutive S, e.g. regions 2-4 in panels d and e, meaning
that crossing the 2-4 boundary the two- and three-style equilibria become both of branching type, or the8
three-style equilibrium is already so in region 2 close to the boundary, though not reachable by the fashion
dynamics starting from a two-style society.10
Further note that the effect of the morality payoff µ (as well as that of the morality threshold x0) is not
shown in Fig. 2, because there is no such effect. We already noted that µ does not enter the coexistence12
and branching conditions for the mono-style equilibrium (see (22)), and this is confirmed by the numerical
analysis for the further branchings.14
We close the analysis of the model with a technical note on the numerical analysis. When the expression
for the social equilibrium n¯(x) is not available, because the eqs. in (8) cannot be solved analytically, we need16
to solve numerically also for the derivatives of n¯i(x) w.r.t. xj , i, j = 1, . . . , S, to evaluate the coexistence
conditions Ci in (17) (see [Landi et al., 2013] for details).18
4 Discussion
We have shown by means of a mathematical model that purely social interactions—the horizontal dynamics20
of fashion theory [Field, 1970, Robinson, 1976, Simmel, 1904]—promote fashion variety. We have inten-
tionally omitted in the model all vertical drivers of fashion dynamics [Simmel, 1904, Veblen, 1894], i.e., the22
social aspects related to class differentiation and all economic aspects from both the production (business,
marketing, design, and manufacturing) and the consumer (budget) sides.24
We have considered a society of common-class people and we have linked the individuals’ choice of style
with their performance in a social game. The style is described by a one-dimensional continuous trait that26
represents, in agreement with many authors in the fashion literature [Laver, 1937, Lurie, 1981, Steele, 1985,
Veblen, 1894], an abstraction of the sex appeal attributed to consumer goods. The share of different styles in28
the society is ruled by the replicator dynamics of EGT [Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Maynard Smith, 1982],
saying that the styles with higher expected payoff in the game have higher chances to be adopted, by imitation30
or in response to word-of-mouth diffusion. Stylistic innovations are introduced on a slower time scale by
one or a few individuals and compete with the mainstream styles established in the society. AD [Dercole32
and Rinaldi, 2008, Geritz et al., 1997, 1998, Metz et al., 1996] deterministically describes the evolution
of fashion resulting from sequences of successful small innovations, that accumulate in a macroscopic and34
continuous change of style. Remarkably, close to the stationary points of the fashion dynamics, mainstream
and innovative styles can coexist under disruptive social selection. That is, further successful innovations of36
the two initially similar styles make them more and more distinct, a process called evolutionary branching
that establishes the innovation as a new mainstream style in the society.38
Our model is in line with the view of Blumer [1969], who consider fashion change as dominated by
intra-class social interactions (the horizontal dynamics), rather than governed by (vertical) inter-class and40
economic drivers. Consistently with the social principles of fashion theory [Blumer, 1969, Lowe and Lowe,
1983, Sproles, 1985], we have taken the following four rewarding mechanisms into account in the social game:42
a payoff for being trendy, i.e., to conform to one of the established mainstream styles [Efferson et al., 2008b];
a payoff for being original, i.e., to proclaim identity being distinct from the mainstream styles [Esposito,44
2011]; a payoff for being sexy in the competition for dating [Laver, 1937, Lurie, 1981, Steele, 1985, Veblen,
1894]; a payoff for respecting the morality codes uniformly accepted in the society [Lowe and Lowe, 1983].46
The payoffs are measured in terms of dating success at a social event [Barber, 1999], attended by a group of
randomly selected individuals.48
Starting from a stylistic uniform society, we have formally shown that the tradeoff between sexy and
12
austere styles stabilizes fashion evolution at an equilibrium style, that is as sexy/austere as large/small is
the ratio of the corresponding payoffs. This is not surprising, but interestingly shows that the other cardinal2
social tradeoff of fashion, conformity vs. identity, plays no role in the evolution of a single style. The trendy
and originality payoffs are, in contrast, the crucial parameters regulating evolutionary branching. Our main4
conclusion is that a relative advantage to be original vs. trendy fosters fashion variety. This result might also
seem unsurprising, since a premium to minorities allows the coexistence between innovative and mainstream6
styles (no one can dominate the other), regardless of their relative sexiness (see the coexistence condition
C1 < 0 in (22)). However, that the premium is also responsible for the divergence of the two initially similar8
coexisting styles, as predicted by evolutionary branching (see the branching condition B1 > 0 in (22)), is
more remarkable. Moreover, the endogenous generation of different styles is obtained with a homogeneous10
model society, in which all individuals uniformly perceive, measure, and judge the influence of style in the
social interaction. This simplifying assumption makes our main result even stronger.12
For branching to occur, the unbalance between the trendy and originality payoffs must overcome the
stabilizing forces of sex appeal and morality. Moreover, the coexistence of different styles is promoted in14
highly connected societies (large N) and, after mainstream-innovative coexistence, branching is more easily
triggered if people are more sensitive to style (see the effect of a large α on B1 > 0 under C1 < 0 in (22)).16
And all the above results have been confirmed numerically starting from the two-style society developing
after the first branching up to a 4-style society, suggesting that a cascade of branchings can generate a rich18
fashion variety in societies and fashion sectors where originality is highly considered.
Our model is intentionally minimal and at the same time general. It is aimed at answering the basic20
question on whether the sole social principles of fashion—conformity, identity, sexiness, and morality—can
endogenously generate diversity of style. As such, it cannot be tailored to fit a specific historical example or22
used for quantitative prediction. Moreover, without considering inter-class and economic drivers, our model
directly pertains to particular kind of fashion issue, e.g. men shaving style and, to a certain extent, women24
hairstyle, characterized by little budget constraints and individuals free to adapt and innovate their own
style.26
Perhaps the best validation of our model is the qualitative interpretation of the blooming of styles
observed in the western societies in the 1990s [Evans, 2007] Most likely due to the economic recession (an28
economic driver), people in the 1990s were no longer used to follow fashion slavishly, a sharp contrast to the
highly “a la mode” 1970s and 1980s [Steele, 2000]. Fashion in the 1990s was free around a new standard of30
minimalism, and styles of stark simplicity became the vogue. The anti-conformist approach to fashion led
to the popularisation of the casual chic look, a trend which continued into the 2000s. From the 1970s to32
the 1990s people shifted value from conformity to identity (reduced trendy payoff τ and increased originality
payoff ε) and this, according to our model, generated a variety of contrasting styles, from the most moral to34
the most libertine.
A variety of mainstream styles was also observed in the 1920s [Blum, 1981], compared to the uniform and36
formal style of the XIX century. On the wave of optimism brought by the end of the war, social customs and
morals were indeed relaxed and the mood became more informal and youthful (lower µ and β and higher σ38
and ε). However, the conformism to the mainstream styles vertically dictated by the fashion designers and
the high class remains significant (large τ), so it is questionable whether the variety of style was vertically40
or horizontally generated. Similarly, the prosperity developed in the western societies after World War II
generated a variety of different styles (e.g. in women skirt length, from the mini-skirt to knee- and ankle-42
lengths, see e.g. [Buckley and Fawcett, 2001, Steele, 2000], compared with the uniform and sober clothing
before and during the war (reflecting the economic situation and political regimes). This is however again a44
mix of vertical and horizontal drivers.
Additionally, fashion trends throughout the 1990s recycled styles from previous decades [Evans, 2007],46
notably the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s [Laver et al., 2002, Mendes and de la Haye, 1999, Tortora and Eubank,
2010], and this is also shown by our model. We have found no fashion cycles, in the strict sense of periodic48
solutions of the AD canonical equation (16), but our simulations indeed show that recurrent diversification
is also accompanied by the return in vogue of old-fashioned (e.g. vintage) styles. Although fashion cycles50
are often thought to be vertically dictated [Caulkins et al., 2007, Sproles, 1981]—as recurrent innovations
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put forward by fashion producers [Pesendorfer, 1995]—or due to a broader external, e.g. cultural, change
[Frings, 1999, Lowe and Lowe, 1990], a periodic evolution of fashion could be possible under particular2
horizontal hypotheses (as envisaged in Young [1937] and by Miller et al. [1993]). And even a never-ending
and always new chaotic evolution [Dercole and Rinaldi, 2010, Dercole et al., 2010a] could be found with4
different hypotheses on the social game. Or even cycles of recurrent branching and extinction [Dercole,
2003]—evolution first leads to a branching point, then drives one of the two developing style to extinction—6
could best describe the evolution of some fashion sectors. E.g., when the seek for originality separates a
neutral style into two sexy and austere alternatives, and further innovation makes the sexy style so provocative8
up to the collapse under the morality judgment. But all this is left for further research.
Back to our modeling assumptions, we find the basic assumptions of AD consistent with the classical10
hypotheses on fashion dynamics. Specifically, the assumption of small innovations and the smooth fashion
dynamics provided by the AD canonical equation are in line with the views of Blumer [1969] and Lowe12
and Lowe [1983], who see fashion change as a gradual and continuous process, in which new fashions evolve
from those previously established in the society. In contrast, the assumption of rare innovations—formally14
needed to separate the social time scale of everyday life from the time scale of fashion evolution—might not
well fit some fashion sectors, e.g. those related to consumer hi-tech, but can be relaxed [Mesze´na et al.,16
2005]. And even when large innovations do occasionally occur, the AD framework can handle them. The
resident-invader model (the globally extended replicator eq. (6) with S+1 styles, the last being the invader)18
can be used to establish the fate of the innovation—whether it replaces some of the mainstream styles or
coexists with them—and once the new social equilibrium is found, a new phase of gradual innovation can20
be described by the corresponding canonical equation. Fashion evolution is hence described by phases of
gradual evolution punctuated by major breakthroughs.22
Alternatively, one can use an individual-based stochastic approach, as originally done in the context of
horizontal fashion dynamics by Miller et al. [1993]. Miller’s et al. model considers an explicit social network24
and divides the social peers of each individual into two classes based on (static) reputation. With synchronous
discrete transitions, each individual adapts his/her own style by maximizing an utility based on a personal26
value given to the style and on the tendency to emulate/diversify from respected/disrespected neighbors.
In contrast, our model is population based (a mean-field for the all-to-all network), class-unstructured, and28
explicitly describes the social mechanisms of the interaction. While Miller’s et al. find both uniform and
heterogeneous solutions, style variety is a priori induced by the class division according to reputation and30
by the locality of the interaction, whereas the emergence of style variety through evolutionary branching is
endogenous in our model. Miller’s et al. also find cyclical behaviors, supporting the idea that purely social32
interactions might sustain fashion cycles.
By a sort of continuity argument, our model can be realistically applied to describe fashion phenomena in34
which the vertical inter-class and economic drivers are sub-dominant with respect to the social interactions
[Blumer, 1969] (e.g. the above interpretation of style branching in the 1920s and after World War II up36
to the 1980s) [Buckley and Fawcett, 2001, Laver et al., 2002, Mendes and de la Haye, 1999, Tortora and
Eubank, 2010]. On the other hand, our results have a speculative value in situations in which the vertical38
drivers cannot be neglected, in the sense of showing what would be the scenario were the vertical drivers
absent, or the significance of the vertical drivers were the predicted horizontal scenario different from the40
one observed. E.g., a monopolistic producer could decide to inhibit fashion variety in a situation in which
our model suggests branching.42
Whether the vertical inter-class and economic drivers significantly affect the dynamics of fashion or not is
debatable [Blumer, 1969, Lowe and Lowe, 1990, Miller et al., 1993, Simmel, 1904, Sproles, 1985]. In any case,44
our model provides a mechanistic way of describing the social interactions that are relevant for fashion, a low
level block on the top of which the class and the economic levels could be vertically added. In a monopoly46
[Pesendorfer, 1995], in a duopoly [Caulkins et al., 2007], or in a market with several producers, a fashion
maker could introduce (costly) innovations to steer the population in a direction that is good for his/her48
own business. And the competition between different producers could be modeled as a strategic business
game, where the producers’ strategies could evolve, in response to strategic innovations, and perhaps lead50
to branching and/or extinctions of fashion makers.
14
Another natural extension for our social level is that of considering the structure of the social network.
All-to-all connectivity is a simplification that gives compact, mean-field, population models. Although the2
large and increasing connectivity of the hi-tech age seems to shift the interaction model to all-to-all and
large group games, there is, at the same time, increasing recognition that the population structure can4
critically affect functioning in EGT (see e.g. [De´barre et al., 2014, Tan et al., 2014]). With an explicit
network structure, the model becomes individual based, with rounds of the social game played within groups6
of neighbors extracted in the network graph. The challenge is to derive compact mean-field models, with
particular attention to the model parameters describing the network structure. And the exogenous and/or8
the endogenous dynamics of the network is another important aspect to be taken into account. This will be
the hot topic of research in EGT for the next years. Specifically for the social aspects of fashion, interesting10
positive (as well as negative) network externalities, based on the number of neighbors who are consuming a
particular brand or product, could be considered, in the spirit of Miller’s et al. [1993] reputation mechanism.12
Finally, our work enlarges the number of studies that make use of the evolutionary paradigm outside
biology, to study, just to mention a few, social [Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Mesoudi, 2009, Shennan, 2001],14
economic [Henrich and Boyd, 2008], technological [Dercole et al., 2008, 2010b], cultural [Boyd and Richer-
son, 1988, Efferson et al., 2008a, Foley and Mirazo´n Lahr, 2011, Henrich and McElreath, 2003], linguistic16
[Nowak and Krakauer, 1999], and religious [Atran and Henrich, 2010, Doebeli and Ispolatov, 2010] evolution
and diversification through human history [Mesoudi, 2011, Richerson and Christiansen, 2013], with mutual18
benefits of the various social science disciplines.
Acknowledgements20
The authors are grateful to S. Rinaldi for precious discussions at an early stage of this project and to F.
Breitenecker, J. P. Caulkins, and D. Vainchtein for their interest and comments during the ENOC 201422
Conference [Landi and Dercole, 2014]. The contribution of the three anonymous Reviewers is also acknowl-
edged. The work was supported by the Italian Ministry for University and Research (under contract FIRB24
RBFR08TIA4).
15
A Computation of the expected payoffs
The expressions (4a,b) of the expected payoffs P1 and P2 in a two-style society are obtained from (3a,b) by2
exploiting the properties of the binomial distribution. Specifically, for a focal x1-strategist, the probabilities
to meet with N2 = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 x2-strategists (and N1− 1 = N − 1−N2 other x1-strategists) sum to one,4
i.e.
N−1∑
N2=0
(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2 = (n1+ n2)
N−1 = 1, (A.1)
and the average numbers of x2- and x1-strategists in the group of N players are given by6
N−1∑
N2=0
N2
(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2 = (N−1)n2
N−1∑
N2=1
(
N−2
N2−1
)
n
N−2−(N2−1)
1 n
N2−1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n1+n2)N−2
= (N−1)n2 (A.2a)
and
N−1∑
N2=0
N1︸︷︷︸
N−N2
(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2 = N − (N−1)n2 = 1 + (N−1)(1− n2) = 1 + (N−1)n1. (A.2b)
Then, substituting the expressions of Pτ (x1), Pε(x1), Pσ(x1), Pµ(x1) from (1a–d) with S = 2 into (3a)8
and separately collecting the trendy and morality payoffs—independent of N1 and N2—from the originality
and sexy payoffs—which are linear in N1 and N2—we get10
P1 =
(
Pτ (x1) + Pµ(x1)
)N−1∑
N2=0
(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2
+
N−1∑
N2=0
(
ε
(
1
2 −
N1
N
− N2
N
exp(−α(x1 − x2)
2)
)
+ σ(x1 − x2)
N2
N−1
)(
N−1
N2
)
nN−1−N21 n
N2
2
= τ
(
n1+ n2 exp(−α(x1 − x2)
2)
)
+ µ(1− exp(β(x1 − x0)))
+ ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
n1 −
N−1
N
n2 exp(−α(x1 − x2)
2)
)
+ σn2(x1 − x2), (A.3)
which coincides with (4a).
Similarly for a focal x2-strategist, we have the binomial properties12
N−1∑
N1=0
(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2 = (n1+ n2)
N−1 = 1, (A.4)
N−1∑
N1=0
N1
(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2 = (N−1)n1
N−1∑
N1=1
(
N−2
N1−1
)
nN1−11 n
N−2−(N1−1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n1+n2)N−2
= (N−1)n1, (A.5a)
and14
N−1∑
N1=0
N2︸︷︷︸
N−N1
(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2 = N − (N−1)n1 = 1 + (N−1)(1− n1) = 1 + (N−1)n2, (A.5b)
and the expected payoff
P2 =
(
Pτ (x2) + Pµ(x2)
)N−1∑
N1=0
(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2
+
N−1∑
N1=0
(
ε
(
1
2 −
N1
N
exp(−α(x2 − x1)
2)− N2
N
)
+ σ(x2 − x1)
N1
N−1
)(
N−1
N1
)
nN11 n
N−1−N1
2
= τ
(
n1 exp(−α(x2 − x1)
2) + n2
)
+ µ(1− exp(β(x2 − x0)))
+ ε
(
1
2 −
N−1
N
n1 exp(−α(x2 − x1)
2)− 1
N
− N−1
N
n2
)
+ σn1(x2 − x1), (A.6)
which coincides with (4b).16
16
The proof of the general formula (5) for Pi in a S-style society is fully analogous. The expected payoff
Pi of a focal xi-strategist is given by2
Pi =
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
(
Pτ (xi) + Pε(xi) + Pσ(xi) + Pµ(xi)
)
Prob[N1, . . . , Ni−1, . . . , NS ], (A.7a)
where Nj counts the number of xj-strategists in the group of N players (including the focal one for j = i)
and4
Prob[N1, . . . , Ni − 1, . . . , NS ] :=
(N−1)!
N1! · · · (Ni−1)! · · ·NS !
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S (A.7b)
is the multinomial probability of extracting the (N1, . . . , Ni−1, . . . , NS)-composition for the N−1 non-focal
players.6
According to the properties of the multinomial distribution, we have
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
(N−1)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···NS!
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S = (n1+ · · ·+ nS)
N−1 = 1, (A.8)
8
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
Nj
(N−1)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···NS!
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S
= (N−1)nj
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni,Nj≥1
(N−2)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···(Nj−1)!···NS !
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
Nj−1
j · · ·n
NS
S
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n1+···+nS)N−2
= (N−1)nj, j 6= i,(A.9a)
and
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
Ni︸︷︷︸
N−
S∑
j=1
j 6=i
Nj
(N−1)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···NS !
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S
= N −
S∑
j=1
j 6=i
(N−1)nj = 1 + (N−1)
(
1−
S∑
j=1
j 6=i
nj
)
= 1+(N−1)ni. (A.9b)
Then, substituting the expressions of Pτ (x1), Pε(x1), Pσ(x1), Pµ(x1) from (1a–d) into (A.7a) and sepa-10
rately collecting the trendy and morality payoffs from the originality and sexy ones, we get
Pi =
(
Pτ (xi) + Pµ(xi)
) ∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
(N−1)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···NS!
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S
+
S∑
j=1
(
ε
(
1
2 −
Nj
N
exp(−α(xi − xj)
2)
)
+ σ(xi − xj)
Nj
N−1
) ∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
(N−1)!
N1!···(Ni−1)!···NS!
nN11 · · ·n
Ni−1
i · · ·n
NS
S
= Pτ (xi) + Pµ(xi) + ε
(
1
2 −
1
N
− N−1
N
S∑
j=1
nj exp(−α(xi − xj)
2)
)
+ σ
S∑
j=1
nj(xi − xj), (A.10)
which coincides with (5).12
17
Finally, note that the above multi-index sums can be organized as
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni≥1
≡
N−1∑
N1=0
· · ·
N−1−
i−2∑
k=1
Nk∑
Ni−1=0
N−1−
i−1∑
k=1
Nk∑
Ni+1=0
· · ·
N−1−
S−1∑
k=1,k 6=i
Nk∑
NS=0
, (A.11a)
∑
N1+···+NS=N
Ni,Nj≥1
≡
N−2∑
N1=0
· · ·
N−2−
i−2∑
k=1
Nk∑
Ni−1=0
N−2−
i−1∑
k=1
Nk∑
Ni+1=0
· · ·
N−1−
j−1∑
k=1,k 6=i
Nk∑
Nj=1
· · ·
N−2−
S−1∑
k=1,k 6=i
Nk∑
NS=0
, (A.11b)
where Ni = N−
∑S
k=1,k 6=iNk and 1< i < S and j > i+1 are assumed (with little loss of generality).2
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